Brazil is home of one of the largest communities of behavior analysts. It is a common cultural feature of this community (at least in comparison to other countries) to have members dedicated to do theoretical research. The Working Group on Theoretical Research in Behavior Analysis is formed by 21 Brazilian behavior analysts, all Ph.Ds. with positions in Brazilian universities, who conduct exclusively (or mostly) theoretical research: i.e., research on conceptual, epistemological, ontological, historical, ethical, and political issues related to behavior analysis. This group is part of the ANPEPP, the Brazilian National Association for Research and Postgraduate Studies in Psychology (https://www.anpepp.org.br). The articles published in this volume have at least one author who is member of this working group.

Zilio, Diego (2023) Editorial: Special Volume Working Group on Theoretical Research in Behavior Analysis, Behavior and Philosophy, 51, i.

Abstract: B.F. Skinner has committed himself to determinism at different points in his lifework. However, the Skinnerian scientific system is not based on fixed epistemological assumptions. This article aims to demonstrate that Skinnerian statements about determinism have different meanings, and some of them may also coincide with the opposite thesis of determinism (i.e., indeterminism). Concepts associated with determinism were examined within the three models of behavior proposed by Skinner (reflex, operant, and selection by consequences). This conceptual investigation showed that the formulations within the reflex model are consistent with determinism; those within the operant model are ambiguous as to their compatibility with deterministic and indeterministic scientific conceptions; and those within selection by consequences are aligned with scientific indeterminism. Skinner’s repeated commitment to determinism should not lead behavior analysts to assume it is an uncontroversial “ism”; therefore, other interpretations of behavior analysis’s fundamental postulates are possible.

Keywords: science; behavior analysis; determinism; indeterminism.

Laurenti, Carolina (2023) On B.F. Skinner’s (in)Determinism, Behavior and Philosophy, 51, 1-14.

Abstract: Experimental studies in Behavior Analysis have consistently demonstrated the effect of reinforcement contingencies on the increase in behavioral variability in nonhumans and humans. Despite their regularity and generality, the data presented in the literature have given rise to a variety of interpretations, leading to controversies over how to account for reinforced behavioral variability. The present study systematized the literature about variability with the aim of identifying and characterizing these interpretations, their underpinnings, and the criticisms directed at them. We identified interpretations involving the notion of variation as an operant behavior or, at least, as an operant dimension of behavior, and interpretations that dismissed this notion in characterizing the increase in variability as a secondary effect of behavioral processes present in variation contingencies. Not all interpretations found were based on established empirical bases, and only some were commented on or criticized by authors in the area.

Keywords: Behavioral Variability; Theory; Operant; Reinforcement; Behavior Analysis

Ferreira da Costa Leite, Emerson, Micheletto, Nilza (2023) Interpretations for Reinforced Behavioral Variability: A Comparative Systematization, Behavior and Philosophy, 51, 15-34.

Abstract: Radical behaviorism suggests that three of the most fundamental concepts in philosophy—namely, truth, goodness, and beauty—can all be interpreted as verbal responses selected by their consequences. Behavioral selection thus serves as a wide-ranging interpretive principle for radical behaviorism—one that applies to all philosophical problems. In this article, I aim to explore some implications of this perspective for the treatment of the concepts of truth, goodness, and beauty. I conclude that these implications characterize radical behaviorism as a distinctive and unorthodox proposal in the traditional philosophical landscape. 

Keywords: radical behaviorism, transcendentals, selection by consequences

Dittrich, Alexandre (2023) The True, the Good, and the Beautiful: Selection by Consequences as a Unifying Approach to the “Transcendentals” of Philosophy, Behavior and Philosophy, 51, 35-44.

Abstract: A philosophical tradition characterized by the praising of rationality, science, and critical thinking, secular humanism also consists in a cultural movement that opposes the resort to religious, ideological dogmas, pseudoscientific practices, and superstitions as criteria for morality and decision-making processes. Historically, different manifestos and declarations emerged as iconic expressions of such movement, one of the most important being the 1980 Secular Humanist Declaration. Taking as its starting point a controversy involving the presence of B. F. Skinner among the countersigners of the declaration, this piece examines the extent to which radical behaviorism could be considered a secular humanist philosophy. To this end, the ten tenets set out in the Secular Humanist Declaration are presented and evaluated in terms of their affinities or divergences in relation to Skinner’s stances expressed throughout his philosophical work. Finally, we evaluate how radical behaviorism could feasibly contribute to a secular humanist agenda, by providing more effective ways for the accomplishment of secular humanist values.

Keywords: Secular humanism. Radical behaviorism. B. F. Skinner. Values.

Alves da Rocha, César Antonio, Brunkow, Fernanda (2023) Is B. F. Skinner’s Radical Behaviorism a Secular Humanist Philosophy? Behavior and Philosophy, 51, 45-59.

Abstract: Social justice is a controversial theme permeated by the dichotomy between social equality and economic equality. This paper attempted to explore contact and divergence points between the Skinnerian and Rawlsian societal models and their relation to justice. To this end, the two works, Theory of Justice as Fairness and Walden Two were used to characterize the structural contingencies prescribed by the authors in light of the constitutive elements of justice. Points of contact were identified regarding the adoption of ethical principles, i.e., a Conception of the Good that advocates human life as the ultimate end. Differences were observed regarding the appropriateness of justice. Unlike Rawls, Skinner conceived justice as a discourse to justify inequality and hide the social contingencies of control. The author defended an arrangement of structural contingencies that fostered economic and social equality as opposed to compensatory distributive criteria that legitimized and reverberated inequality. However, Skinner denied politics as the proper field for such changes. Finally, we highlight that the effective confrontation of inequalities is related to the struggle for a social transformation that results in a new political, economic, and social scenario.

 Keywords: social justice, concealing inequality, radical behaviorism, social transformation.

Batista, Mariana, Mansano Fernandes, Diego, Muchon de Melo, Camila (2023) (In)Compatibilities Between the Rawlsian and Skinnerian Perspectives of Social Justice, Behavior and Philosophy, 51, 60-81.

Abstract: This paper aims to present guidelines for reading and writing behavior-analytic historical texts. It was updated and adapted from the published material used by S. R. Coleman for the analysis of literature in the History of Psychology. In addition to the contextualization of Behavior Analysis as a psychological school, 11 thematic categories are presented, namely: Biographical History, Conceptual History, Institutional History, History of Disciplines, History of Research Topics, History of Methods, History of Apparatus, History of Events, History of Social Processes, History of Texts, and History of Debates. Thus, this guide seeks to assist those interested in History of Behavior Analysis by defining and delimiting different objects of study in this field. It can also encourage historiographical production by indicating new research problems, showing the absence of certain phenomena and/or the lack of historiographical studies on them. It also serves as a tool for readers of the History of Behavior Analysis in identifying the interrelationships between phenomena and the historical limits of a text.

Key words: Reading Guide, Guidelines, Historiography, History of Behavior Analysis

Kois Guimarães, Renan, Muchon de Melo, Camila (2023) Guidelines for Reading and Writing Texts in the History of Behavior Analysis, Behavior and Philosophy, 51, 82-101.

Abstract: The philosophical debate on reduction and emergence commonly springs from the division of domains (and subdomains) correlated with the sciences, such as biological domains (e.g., genetics and physiology) and psychological domains (e.g., learning, perception, emotions). These domains are interconnected, with some depending on or composed of elements from others. The debate revolves around whether certain domains are reducible or irreducible to those on which they depend or are composed. In this work, following an examination of common interpretations of the notions of reduction and emergence, we aim to identify and compare radical behaviorism and molar behaviorism as regards the reducibility or irreducibility between the following pairs of domains: (i) behavioral – physiological; (ii) psychological – behavioral; (iii) teleological – contingencies of natural or operant selection; and (iv) cultural – behavioral. This article contributes, among other things, to explaining several core similarities and differences between radical behaviorism (as worked out by B. F. Skinner) and molar behaviorism (as worked out by W. M. Baum and H. Rachlin); as well as some conceptual aspects pertaining to the identity of behavior analysis and its interfaces with related research areas both in natural and social sciences.

Keywords: reduction; emergence; radical behaviorism; molar behaviorism; teleological behaviorism; behavior analysis.

Lazzeri, Filipe, Zilio, Diego (2023) Commitments with Reductive and Emergent Relations in Behavior Analysis, Behavior and Philosophy, 51, 102-124.

Abstract: Understanding scientific practice as a product of reinforcement contingencies renders science incompatible with scientific neutrality, but it does not indicate the role of values in science. Taking this into account, in this article, we discuss the function of values in behavior analytic science. Initially, we indicate that the scientific community commonly engages in the construction of knowledge based on epistemic criteria that, although indispensable, must be critically analyzed, considering its history and function to achieve a description of the non-epistemic values that guide the criteria of scientificity (epistemic consciousness). We also indicate that epistemic criteria are insufficient to guide scientific practice since ethical and political values are part of the research process and must be equally recognized and declared (non-epistemic consciousness). Second, we demonstrate that this thesis is compatible with the Skinnerian conception of science. We conclude that the community should guarantee contingencies to ensure that the scientist is committed to consistent epistemic values and that the incorporation of anti-capitalist, anti-racist, and anti-patriarchal critique into the worldview of behavior analysts would serve as an antidote against intolerable practices of human subjugation.

Keywords: epistemic consciousness, non-epistemic consciousness, radical behaviorism, scientific research, values.

Spector Azoubel, Marcos, Rodrigues Fonseca-Júnior, Amilcar (2023) Toward a Behavior Analysis Committed to Values, Behavior and Philosophy, 51, 125-135.

Abstract: Edgar A. Singer Jr. is largely forgotten. Yet in the early twentieth century he was one of the most persistent proponents for a theory of “mind as behavior.” This essay explores Singer’s theory of mind as a form of experimentally-definable behavior. This interpretation of mind is derived from Singer’s “philosophy of experiment,” which delimits the forms of questions that can have meaningful answers. Valid questions, according to Singer’s theory, must appeal to phenomena that are public in some sense and which have verifiable effects on our “mechanical images” of nature (which is not to say that such phenomena are themselves solely mechanical). From this perspective, Singer is able to give behavioral criteria for attributing “mind” to organisms and for such “mental faculties” as purpose, sensation, consciousness, and thought. It might be wondered how Singer’s experimental concept of mind compares with B. F. Skinner’s better-known concept of private events. Although there are difficulties involved in the interpretation of each, it would seem that Singer and Skinner are largely in agreement, although they emphasize different factors in the behavioral interpretation of mind.

Dennen, David (2022) Mind as an Experimental Object: On the Behaviorism of Edgar A. Singer, Jr. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 1-19.

Abstract: The current paper overviews of the notion of intensionality as it is presented in the work of Ullin Place, with the aim of characterising Place’s somewhat neglected thinking about this topic. Ullin Place’s work showed a development regarding his views concerning this topic, which, in themselves, illustrate a variety of possible stances that can be taken towards the concept of intensionality. Ultimately, Place suggested that ‘intensional’ statements are not necessarily connected with ‘mentalistic’ language, nor with ‘mentalistic’ explanations. Rather, Place came to the view that intensionality should be taken to be the mark of the ‘conversational’ – that is, it is a property of verbal behaviour that characterises non-scientific everyday discourse. This view has relevance to furthering the understanding of Place’s work regarding intensionality, and also relevance for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science.

Keywords: intensionality; extensionality; Ullin Place; mentalism; explanation

Reed, Phil (2022) The Concept of Intensionality in the Work of Ullin T. Place. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 20-38.

Abstract: Contextual Behavior Science distinguishes successful workings from ultimate goals in terms of justification. Workings are justified when they successfully meet the verbally stated goals. Since ultimate goals are not workings they cannot be justified. The Contextual Behavior Scientist faces a dilemma. It is argued that on one hand they are forced to restrict justification of the workings to an idiosyncratic perspective; to the subjective desires or ultimate goals of the individual. On the other hand, the reliance on the historical, social, verbal, and evolutionary context, which in part justifies “successful workings” will begin to provide justification for the ranking of “ultimate goals.”  That is, the resources available are just those that appeal to the normative values (epistemic and otherwise) already instantiated in our common historical, social, verbal, and evolutionary context and which are already in place whether workings are justified or not.

Keywords: Successful workings, ultimate goals, Contextual Behavior Science, reasons

Vogt, Rudy H. (2022) Can One Consistently Hold that “Ultimate Goals” are Not Justified While “Successful Workings” are? Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 39-51.

Abstract: Reed (2022) states that according to Ullin Place’s latest view, intensional statements are not necessarily connected with mentalist language and explanations, and intensionality is the mark of the conversational. This is false. Place’s view is that intensionality is the mark of a quotation. Quotations are sentences that express the content of propositional attitudes. They are characterised by what Frege called ‘indirect reference’ and Quine ‘referential opacity’. Intensionality is nothing more than this. Intensional statements stating propositional attitudes are at the heart of the mentalist language.

Propositional attitudes are dispositions. Dispositions are the nature of things and are at the core of all sciences. The doings of a person are the active manifestations of dispositions. Place defines mentalism at the level of the person, which is also the level of behaviourism. This contrasts with a standard definition of mentalism at the sub-personal level, also known as centrism. Doing or behaving is interacting with the environment. This is common to the scientific approaches at the level of the person. Articulating the same conceptual foundation and language and each approach having its dialect must be possible. This is “relevan[t] for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science” (Reed, 2022).

Keywords: behaviourism, explanation, intensionality, mentalism, quotation, psychological languages, Ullin Place

Place, Thomas W. (2022) Understanding the Types of Language in Behavioural Science: Reply to Phil Reed on the Work of Ullin T. Place. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 52-64.

 

Abstract: Natural selection precedes the first cellulae, beginning with the synthesis of large organic compounds, as organic complexity gradually evolved in natural history. Chemotropism of organic molecules, formation of larger molecules, and molecular groupings resulted in individuation, corresponding to the emergence of molecular layers, dividing internal and external environments, protocells, and multicellular assemblies. Reactions resulting in advances of the organic unit through a given gradient are selected. Eventually, sparse signals began triggering adaptive movements. Responding to signals is a core property of life, consisting of energy transformation chains. Consistently anticipating changes in the flow of events in the organism and its surroundings defines the continuity from early organic compound reactions to gradients, to the capacity of anticipation in cordata and symbolic consciousness. Cycles of synchronous afferent activity, initiated at sensors of the internal and external environment, are followed by efferent activity. Consciousness is the organism’s capability to continuously adjust to internal and external environments, respond consistently to contacted events associated in space and time, and effectively prepare for contact with subsequent events. Consciousness predates and dispenses with symbolic capacity. Evolution of communication and symbolic behavior in hominids leads to the emergence of symbolic awareness, a behavioral adaptation to the symbolic environment.

Keywords: Beginnings of natural selection, anticipation, sensory-motor integration, symbolic environment, symbolic behavior.

Galvão, O. F. (2022) On the Evolution of Consciousness. Behavior and Philosophy, 50, 65-79.

 

Abstract: Ecological psychology and enactivism are close relatives in that they share an interest in positioning the behaving organism as an active agent and in interpreting this with reference to ecological and evolutionary ideas. But they also differ in their uses of biology and the concept of information. I review these uses, relate them to ideas in behaviorism, and conclude that a version of enactivism, championed by Daniel Hutto and colleagues, is the more viable hypothesis. I extend this radical enactivist effort into evolutionary enactivism as an exercise in parsimonious theory building that aims to avoid essentialism.

 

Dickins, Thomas E. (2021) Ecological Psychology, Radical Enactivism and Behavior: An Evolutionary Perspective. Behavior and Philosophy, 49, 1-23.

Abstract: Charles Darwin’s contributions were celebrated worldwide during 2009, the bicentennial anniversary of his birth. A household word, “Darwinism,” has become synonymous with the doctrine of evolution, which has exerted immense influence in the biological sciences, philosophy, political science, psychology, and the other social sciences. But the concept of evolution existed long before Darwin published in 1859. Furthermore, Darwinism was developed and promoted by others, while Darwin himself remained in the background, doing almost no public promoting and holding some views, including those concerning selective breeding and the interpretation of Lamarck’s work, that he should have known were mistaken. While he had the leisure to spend a life observing nature, countless others born without the luxury of an inheritance, like Wallace, Huxley, Lloyd-Morgan, and Romanes played a far greater role in developing and establishing evolutionary thought. Darwin collected the facts that brought victory for the doctrine of evolution, but its development owed more to others, and even during his lifetime had far surpassed his specific contributions. We trace the history of evolutionary thought and consider questions concerning Darwin’s delay in publishing, the cause of his illness, the Huxley/Wilberforce “Debate,” and “Organic Selection,” with extra attention paid to the political work of Malthus, the experimental work of Spalding, and the philosophical works of Huxley and Romanes.

Malone, John C., Staddon, J.E.R. (2021) Darwin, Darwinism, and Psychology. Behavior and Philosophy, 49, 24-62.

Abstract: Building on George Price’s formal account of selection, we present an abstract theoretical account of behavioral selection that integrates the domains of individual learning and evolution. From the perspective of the multilevel model of behavioral selection (MLBS), we argue that the covariance based law of effect (CLOE) qualifies as a fundamental principle of behavior in that it provides a general formal framework for selectionist thinking and model building. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach by means of a covariance based model of choice behavior that explains the effects of changeover delays on operant matching.

Borgstede, M., Luque, V.J. (2021) The Covariance Based Law of Effect: A Fundamental Principle of Behavior. Behavior and Philosophy, 49, 63-81.

Abstract: In a 2017 article in Behavior and Philosophy, Elliott Sober suggests that the statistical phenomenon of “screening off” requires the postulation of inner entities that mediate between antecedent and consequent variables in behavioral research. This is a prime example of researchers believing that the disagreements about the role of internal states in psychological explanations can be resolved with a statistical analysis. Sober’s suggestion is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of what behavioral psychologists do. This article is intended to stimulate conversation among behaviorists concerning Sober’s arguments in favor of mentalistic postulations.

Charles, Eric, Thompson, Nicholas S. (2021) Can Statistical Analysis Prove the Need for Cognition in Psychological Theory? Behavior and Philosophy, 49, 82-87.

Abstract: This paper is a reply to Eric Charles and Nick Thompson’s critique of my 2017   paper, “Methodological behaviorism, causal chains, and causal forks.” My paper challenged the behaviorist thesis that postulating inner causes of outward behavior is pointless if the goal is to predict and explain behavior. I used the example of a literal blackbox (a box with a button on one side and two lights on the other) to develop my argument. In the present paper, I clarify my argument and discuss related issues concerning Ockham’s razor and operationalism.

Sober, Elliott (2021) Behaviorism and Blackbox Inference – A Reply to Eric Charles and Nick Thompson. Behavior and Philosophy, 49, 88-90.

I had two main goals when I started the Ph.D. program in Experimental Psychology (Behavior Analysis) at the Institute of Psychology of University of São Paulo more than ten years ago: the first, obviously, was to complete the requirements to receive the Doctoral degree. The second was to explore the treasures hidden at the Institute’s library. Among those were all the volumes of Behavior and Philosophy published to the date. For a researcher on theorical issues in behavior analysis, that was the holy grail. Naturally, I started to make copies (we did not have digital subscriptions back then) and read everything, no matter the subject, from volume 1 to the last available there. I hoped someday to myself publish a paper in Behavior and Philosophy. A few years passed and I did publish in Behavior and Philosophy. Mission accomplished.

Zilio, Diego (2020) Editorial: The Function of Philosophy to Behavior Analysis. Behavior and Philosophy, 48, i-iv.

Abstract: Every Darwinian process consists of variation in a pool or population, recurrence of variants in the population, and selection as differential recurrence of variants. The members in the population vary in some property that functions to serve recurrence, and if some variant functions to serve greater recurrence, that variant increases in the population across time. This characterization applies to biological evolution, cultural evolution, and behavioral evolution.  Contrary to Smith (2019), whether variation is qualitative or quantitative is of little moment.  Selection is passive relative to variation and cannot be said to produce variation. Contrary to Smith, Skinner probably made no such assumption, but rather just took variation in behavior for granted, as inherent. In shaping, or behavioral evolution, recurrence occurs because activities are induced by phylogenetically important events (PIE). The concept of induction has broader explanatory power than the concept of reinforcement, because induction accounts for both non-operant and operant activities. Coupled with covariance between an activity and a PIE, induction removes the problem of the “first instance” that concerned Skinner and now concerns Smith.

Baum, William M. (2020) Drivers of Behavior: Comments on T. L. Smith’s “Selection by Consequences in the Ontogeny of Behavior: The Problem of the First Instance.” Behavior and Philosophy, 48, 1-4.

Terry Smith’s (2019) article is an insightful discussion of the relationship of operant conditioning and natural selection, and of Skinner’s understanding of that relationship. However, there is one part of the article that I think is mistaken. The detail in question concerns whether natural selection can solve what Skinner (1953) calls “the problem of the first instance.” This is the problem of explaining why a trait changes from being uninstantiated in a population to being instantiated. Given the weight that Skinner and others placed on the analogy between natural selection and operant conditioning, the problem of the first instance matters to psychology, and not just to evolutionary biology, as Smith explains.

Sober, Elliott (2020) Natural Selection, Behavioral Conditioning, and the Problem of the First Instance: Comments on Terry Smith’s Paper. Behavior and Philosophy, 48, 5-9.

Abstract: In the target article, Smith (2019) tackles the problem of “the first instance” from a purely selectionist standpoint. He first shows that, intuitions to the contrary notwithstanding, natural selection can explain the occurrence of one particular type of novelty: the occurrence of novel magnitudes in the distribution of a quantitative phenotypic character. Extending this reasoning to the behavioral domain, Smith proposes that behaviorism may solve the problem of behavioral novelty in terms of operant reinforcement, behavioral atoms, and continuous response properties. Contrary to Smith, I argue that operant selectionism fails as an account of behavioral novelty even in simple cases, that selectionism is more crippling than helpful to behavior analysis, and that behaviorism in no way depends on the assumption of fundamentally continuous response dimensions.

Tonneau, François (2020) Behavioral Causation, Continuity, and Novelty. Behavior and Philosophy, 48, 10-17.

Smith argues that Skinner’s selectionist explanation of behavior is limited by its inability to account for the first instance of a behavior that is qualitatively different from behaviors that currently exist in an organism’s repertoire. This may not be the only problem with Skinner’s selectionist account, however, and in fact it may not be the most serious one. A significant element missing from the account is a causal mechanism that explains how behavioral selection occurs at all. That selection occurs is not in doubt, for reinforced behaviors in fact are observed to survive and become more plentiful in an organism’s repertoire. But a causal mechanism that makes selection happen does not appear in Skinner’s theory. Interestingly, this same failing plagued Darwin’s theory of natural selection, and led to significant criticism of it, until Mendelian genetics was rediscovered and provided the causal explanation that was missing (Mayr, 1982; Tryon, 2002).

McDowell, J.J., Riley, Steven (2020) Improving on Skinner: An Evolutionary Theory of Behavior Dynamics and Its Neural Interpretation. Behavior and Philosophy, 48, 18-24.

Abstract: Selectionist sciences such as evolutionary biology and behavior analysis depend on variations. Variations must emerge before environments can act upon them. Yet if first instances in ontogeny are not products of ontogenic selection they are prerequisites for, but not instances of, selection. They count as behavior but not as operant behavior. When Smith (2019) examines how Skinner treats these issues, he relies on snapshots of Skinner’s writings over decades, during which Skinner’s approach evolved from one anchored in physics as a model science to one increasingly aligned with biology. Skinner’s early treatments of the problems of ontogeny and phylogeny differed from his later formulations. Accounts of scientific behavior based only on verbal samples from an evolving scientific corpus typically omit both their antecedents in the laboratory and the research consequences that follow. Furthermore, behavior analytic research has a long history of exploring the sources of novel behavior. Thus, we need not defer to cognitivist views regarding the Problem of the First Instance.

Stahlman, W. David, Catania, A. Charles (2020) First Instances in Phylogenic and Ontogenic Selection as Captured by the Verbal Behavior of Scientists and Philosophers of Science. Behavior and Philosophy, 48, 25-33.

The topic of Smith (2019) was the problem of the first instance. Operant conditioning can readily address why the rate of a recurrent response increases or decreases, but how about the first instance? If the first instance is beyond its reach, there are important learned responses that conditioning cannot explain. Consider suicide. It can occur only once per subject, and therefore can never be explained as the result of reinforcement of prior instances. Is operant conditioning therefore unable to say anything significant about suicide? I argue the answer is no. Operant conditioning could explain a suicide if it were the culmination of a process of differential reinforcement of acts of increasing degree of self-harm.

Smith, Terry L. (2020) Replies to Comments on “Selection by Consequences in the Ontogeny of Behavior: The Problem of the First Instance.” Behavior and Philosophy, 48, 34-46.

The Goldilocks Principle recommends sometimes seeking just the right amount of something. In this paper, I apply this principle to pursue a more judicious view of the relation between philosophy (P) and science (S). Extreme views contrary to GA depict the PS relation as one of destructive incompatibility, indifferent independence, or toxic asymmetric dependence. Contrary to both extremes, the Goldilocks Approach (GA) suggests more moderate depictions of P and S as sufficiently diverse to enjoy professional sovereignty and disagree, but also sufficiently compatible to enable meaningful interdisciplinary cooperation. GA also advises a greater emphasis on case-based investigation that gives equal importance to the context of justification (analytic normative considerations about the logic of linguistic products) and the context of discovery (descriptions of the biopsychosocial aspects of the processes that lead to such products). All this makes for a more balanced, potentially constructive and fruitful relation in selected matters. I exemplify with cases at the intersections between psychology and the Ps of language, mind, and S.

Burgos, José E. (2020) A Goldilocks Approach to the Philosophy-Science Relation. Behavior and Philosophy, 48, 47-68.

Abstract: Philosophy itself is discussed as a use of language by philosophers and others. The primary discursive strategy for western forms of philosophy has been to argue how saying words or sentences can have the properties of ‘truth’ or ‘certainty,’ and the social and political utility of this western project of establishing words as ‘true’ is discussed. But since they are just behaviors, words and sentences can have neither ‘truth’ nor ‘certainty’ because they are contingent on many historical and contextual conditions. Some more recent versions of western philosophy have indeed moved more towards viewing ‘philosophy’ as something people do. Three final discursive strategies for retaining a form of ‘truth’ in words are discussed and dismissed: those resting on ‘beliefs’ as being true or false, ‘thought’ as what can be true or false (Descartes), and the use of the logical method to establish truth and falsity. It is concluded that the main usefulness of philosophy is finding ways to shape people to talk in new ways that might lead to new ways of behaving, but this does not mean that those new ways of behaving will be good or bad, useful or not useful, or true or false.

Guerin, Bernard (2020) From “What is Philosophy” to “The Behavior of Philosophers.” Behavior and Philosophy, 48, 69-81.

Abstract: What, if any, are the roles of traditional metaphysical concerns in a natural science of behavior? There are questions and issues that seem to frame the positions of many who call themselves “behaviorists,” such as mind-behavior or mind-brain relations, realism vs. pragmatism, contextualism vs. mechanism, description vs. explanation, and the meaning of “behavior” itself, all and more of which might be assigned to metaphysical arguments. Positions such as these reflect the many different varieties of behaviorisms, but, in general, seem to have relatively little influence on, or relevance to, how sciences of behavior are actually conducted—that is, by naturalist-empiricist approaches, as with other sciences worthy of the name. Of course, practices in the natural sciences are not without metaphysical stances, but the standpoints mentioned above largely reflect irresolvable or confused verbal entanglements that, at best, might be addressed by an analysis of verbal behavior (e.g., how and why do we come to talk in these ways?). Aside from such an analysis, the positions themselves, while fun to engage, have little or no empirical or even theoretical content and thus seem divorced from a “thoroughgoing” science of behavior.

Marr, M. Jackson (2020) The Shadow of Metaphysics. Behavior and Philosophy, 48, 82-90.

Abstract: This essay explores some possibilities brought by the question about philosophy’s utility for science. We point to some arguments in favor of the importance of philosophy for science in general and Behavior Analysis in particular. We argue that philosophy is the consciousness of science. Without philosophical consciousness, science incurs epistemological naiveties; it uncritically defends scientific neutrality; it risks turning into a mere technique in the service of ideologies that endangers science’s existence. As the philosophy of Behavior Analysis, Radical Behaviorism can play the role of conscience of that science.

Laurenti, Carolina, Lopes, Carlos Eduardo, Abib, José Antônio Damásio (2020) On Usefulness of the Useless: Philosophy as the Consciousness of Scientific Knowledge. Behavior and Philosophy, 48, 91-108.

Abstract: Selection by consequences occurs in both phylogeny and ontogeny. In both domains, qualitative characters pose the ‘problem of the first instance’—i.e., the problem that selection can explain the spread of a qualitative character within a population of individuals, but it cannot explain the first instance of that character. By contrast, selection is able to explain even the first instance of a quantitative character. Skinner limits the analogy between phylogeny and ontogeny precisely along this divide. Although qualitative characters exist in phylogeny, Skinner does not think they exist in ontogeny. This is one of the foundational differences between cognitive science and behavior science. The first purports to explain regularities in the ontogeny of qualitative characters, the latter purports to explain regularities in the ontogeny of quantitative characters.

Smith, Terry L. (2019) Selection by Consequences in the Ontogeny of Behavior: The Problem of the First Instance. Behavior and Philosophy, 47, 1-14.

Abstract: As Meehl (1978) noted four decades ago, psychology has progressed at a significantly slower rate than the natural sciences. This paper argues that one factor that may account for this discrepancy in problem solving progress is that the scientific methods used by psychologists have not properly taken into account unique characteristics of humans that the natural sciences need not consider. This issue has been called “the second demarcation problem” i.e., thata distinction between the methods of the natural sciences (the Naturwissenshaften) and the human sciences (the Geisteswissenshaften) — needs to be made in order to properly understand the research methods that are necessary for scientific progress in each. This paper describes four such unique characteristics of humans as justification for this second demarcation: 1) radical idiography, 2) phenomenological experience, 3) the possibility of free will, and 4) radically new knowledge.

O’Donohue, William T., Burleigh, Kenneth, Kinzler, Alexander D. (2019) Capturing the Unique Nature of the Human Sciences: The Second Demarcation Problem. Behavior and Philosophy, 47, 15-33.

Abstract: In a series of discussions that later became known as the debate between mechanism and contextualism, some behavior analysts vehemently criticized the mechanistic proposition in favor of the contextualist alternative by arguing that the latter would be more consistent with radical behaviorism. The purpose of this article is to revisit this debate, but this time from the perspective of explanatory mechanism. Explanatory mechanism has been gaining attention in several domains of science, from molecular biology to the social sciences, to the point of being considered the most influential position in contemporary philosophy of science. In addition, considering that the debate between contextualism and behaviorism predates the explanatory mechanism revival in philosophy of science, it is important to explore the place of behavior analysis in this new mechanism framework. For this purpose, I will start with the presentation of explanatory mechanism by taking into account three points: the definition of mechanism, the conception of mechanistic explanation, and the methodological strategies of mechanistic research. After that, I will argue that explanatory mechanism not only is immune to the criticisms made in contextualism literature, but also that it is possible (and probably desirable) to adopt explanatory mechanism within contextualism.

 

Zilio, Diego (2019) Mechanisms within Contexts: First Steps Towards an Integrative Approach. Behavior and Philosophy, 47, 34-66.

Abstract: Behavior analysts, as many behaviorists now identify themselves, rarely if ever use the words action, agents, and agency. Instead, following Skinner (1953, 1972), they substitute the eccentric neologism operant for the word action, the imprecise noun organism for the more specific agent, the ambiguous term responses (or the ungrammatical plural behaviors) for the collective noun behavior, while avoiding the abstract noun agency altogether. Here I revive and explain the terminology of action, agents, and agency while adhering to an austere set of guiding principles that should be acceptable to most behaviorists.

Hocutt, Max (2019) Behaviorist Agency. Behavior and Philosophy, 47, 67-80.

Abstract: The Skinner-Chomsky debate has been with us for a long time but has never been fully resolved. Outside behaviorism, Chomsky’s review is generally highly praised. Behaviorists have, however, countered by demonstrating many inaccuracies, misquotes, and basic errors couched in Chomsky’s emotional language. The purpose of this paper is to show that both parties are right. Although much of Chomsky’s criticisms miss the mark, one very basic point that Chomsky himself endlessly repeats is yet unresolved.
This part of Chomsky’s is called the dilemma argument and is shown to be a valid constructive critique that behaviorists would do well to address.
Therefore, it is necessary to go in some detail into this criticism. It is about time to flesh out its basic structure in order to add clarity to its examination. It is however, not the purpose of this paper to answer this criticism but only to highlight it. This will be a determined attempt at clarity, never giving up even when wading through Chomsky’s general emotional attitude – to say the least.

Gudmundsson, Kristján (2018) The Skinner-Chomsky Debate: The Centrality Of The Dilemma Argument. Behavior and Philosophy, 45, 1-24

Abstract: The concept of sign is ambiguous, even in the hands of its most persuasive advocate, the 19th Century semeioticist, Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce’s explication of “sign” is unclear both in the discrimination of its basic elements—signifier, interpretant, and object—and in its specification of the relations among these elements. Resolution of these ambiguities would seem to require invoking an intention to bring the interpretant to bear on the signifier and generate the object. But invocation of intentions as causes would seem to dilute Peirce famously anti-dualist stance. Such a dilution could be avoided, if one were able to provide a non-dualist account of intention. For many years, the Natural Design Perspective has been suggested to conceptualize intentional constructions as referring not to hidden inner causes but as higher order patterns of behavior, more widely spread across time and space than individual acts. Applying the Natural Design Perspective to the definition of “sign” offers the hope of reconciling Peirce’s semeiotics with his monism.

Thompson, Nicholas S. (2018) Signs and Designs. Behavior and Philosophy, 46, 25-46

Abstract: The following essay is a commentary on those parts of William Baum’s “Ontology for Behavior Analysts” that have to do with realism, which Baum defines as belief in the reality of things independent of perception and rejects on the premise that, since “All we have are perceptions,” distinguishing perceptions from their objects leads to an untenable metaphysical dualism. I show that this claim not only does not follow from Baum’s unintelligible Berkeleyian premise but is factually false. Some realists in the history of philosophy—notably Descartes and Locke—have certainly been dualists, but others (notably Hobbes and Spinoza) have not. As I show, the difference is that the dualists hold that mental activity occurs in a disembodied mind, while the materialists reply that it is the function of a material brain. This difference is obscured by Baum’s undefined talk of separate worlds.

Hocutt, Max (2018) George Berkeley Resurrected: A Commentary on Baum’s “Ontology for Behavior Analysis.” Behavior and Philosophy, 46, 47-57

Abstract: Using Hocutt’s vocabulary, I repeat that realism leads inevitably to an unacceptable dualism, because realism distinguishes two categories: real things (material) and perceived things (immaterial). This dichotomy is unacceptable because it creates an unsolvable mystery: we have no way to understand how a thing in one category could affect a thing in the other category. By dividing the subject matter, dualism renders the science incoherent. Someone who asserts that only material things exist (Hobbes, according to Hocutt) is not espousing realism, but monism, and in monism, which assumes only one type of stuff or world, the terms material and immaterial have no meaning. Behavior analysis can advance as the study of behavior in relation to environment, past and present, without having to wait for advances in neurophysiology. Neurophysiology has not yet advanced to the point where behavior analysis can benefit from what it says about the nervous system. Someday neurophysiology may help to understand how the brain participates in behavior, and behavior analysis will be able to tell neurophysiologists what phenomena need to be explained.

Baum, William M. (2018) Berkeley, realism, and dualism: Reply to Hocutt’s “George Berkeley resurrected: A commentary on Baum’s “Ontology for behavior analysis.” Behavior and Philosophy, 46, 58-62

Abstract: My analysis straddles Descartes’ metaphysics and some parts of contemporary philosophy, especially regarding consciousness, and aims to show that once our understanding is freed from philosophical habits that affect current debates, Descartes’ views offer an opportunity to draw important insights. Primarily, I examine Descartes’ mind-body dualism and contrast it with behaviourism, particularly with philosophical behaviourism, focusing on Gilbert Ryle’s dispositional behaviourism and his attacks on Descartes’ dualism. The discussion takes the form of Objections and Replies, presenting the two thinkers in some sort of dialogue with one another. This bring out clearly who is distorting our ordinary language, violating the logical geography of concepts, committing a category mistake, and systematically misleading us. Ryle’s two well-known accusations – the category mistake, and the dogma of the ghost in the machine – are turned, by a reductio ad absurdum, against his own commitments, leading to an evaluation of his highly paradoxical view, and showing how it collapses in on itself. The closing parts touch upon, but do not pursue, some fundamental concerns about personhood and the self, the metaphysics of mind, freedom, and moral significance, and raise the question of what our deepest concerns and responsibility in the twenty-first century must be.

Christofidou, Andrea (2018) Descartes’ Dualism versus Behaviourism. Behavior and Philosophy, 46, 63-99

Abstract: Skinner’s first book, Behavior of Organisms (1938), views psychology as the study of the behavior of the “organism as a whole.” Such a conception excludes internal events such as neural states or covert muscular movements (parts of the organism) from behavior analysis. Skinner’s article, The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms (1945) retracts this exclusion in that it hypothesizes covert behavior (behavior of part of the organism) in behavioral analysis of psychological (i.e., mental) terms. The present article argues that this retraction was a mistake. If one takes a wider, molar view of behavior, there is no need to hypothesize internal events in the behavioral analysis of mental terms. Psychological (that is, mental) terms may be understood as patterns of overt behavior of whole organisms—and are no less real, no less subject to behavior analysis, for that.

Rachlin, Howard (2018) Skinner (1938) and Skinner (1945). Behavior and Philosophy, 46, 100-113

Abstract: Traditionally, philosophical epistemologists have been committed to a 1st-person internalist, Cartesian point of view. But numerous individuals have criticized such an assumption, suggesting instead the adoption of a 3rd-person, externalist behaviorist point of view, a view some have called epistemological behaviorism. But what such an epistemology would be has not been adequately discussed, including its underlying epistemology, and its connection to a behaviorist psychology. To contribute to such a clarification, I present a brief survey of the main philosophical representatives of such an account: Richard Rorty, Gilbert Ryle, John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Willard Quine, and Wilfrid Sellars. The main area of agreement between these individuals is the following: Epistemological behaviorism is the theory that knowledge should be seen in a behavioristic way, not characterized as something inside the mind of the individual—not the Cartesian 1st-peson perspective, but something external—the 2nd- and 3rd-person perspectives. Knowledge is fundamentally behavioral in nature, whether actual current public behavior or contained in behavioral dispositions. Such epistemic behavior can be individual or interindividual (social). Hence, private epistemic behavior, if it exists, is of a secondary nature, deriving from the original public domain and dependent on it. In the future development of this view, several problems remain to be solved.

Kitchener, Richard F. (2018) Epistemological Behaviorism. Behavior and Philosophy, 46, 114-151

From Dr. José E. Burgos

This is the first volume of Behavior and Philosophy published during my tenure as editor. The volume includes one voluntary submission (Lazzeri’s paper) and five special invited papers (the rest of the papers). In a way, then, this is almost a special issue. The papers discuss various topics, from the nature and epistemic role of postulated internal mental states to parsimony, theoretical behaviorism, methodological considerations in clinical psychology, the ontology of behavior analysis, and free will in relation to the argument from responsibility. All of the papers are engaging and thought-provoking. Readers (including the authors themselves) are welcome to submit brief commentaries to these papers (about 1,500 words, not counting title or references; no abstract needed; only one target paper per commentator). Submitted commentaries will be treated as normal submissions and subject to a review process. If the commentaries are accepted, the authors of the target papers will have the chance to reply. As a novelty, and if logistically viable, we will contemplate the possibility of a brief dialogue between the authors and the commentators, where the latter might have the chance to reply to the replies, and the authors of the target paper to reply again (authors will have the last word of the exchange). We will see. No promises. Just an idea that we might consider for future volumes.

Abstract: Mental (or psychological) phenomena (those we refer to by means of terms from so-called folk psychology; e.g., intentions, fears, reasoning processes) are often thought of as confined to the insides of the body. The extended mind view, like behavioral approaches, challenges this assumption, by claiming that some mental phenomena comprise external ingredients. Yet, unlike behavioral approaches, the extended mind view (e.g., as in Clark & Chalmers’ seminal paper) holds that these phenomena often, or depending on the category of mental phenomena always, happen inside the body altogether (which is acknowledged by certain behavioral approaches) and as non-behavioral causes of behaviors (an idea in general rejected by behavioral approaches). This paper highlights what I think are shortcomings of the extended mind view, with a focus upon the functionalist version thereof–extended functionalism. I suggest that this approach misses some major features of psychological concepts, and that it overlooks some behaviors as constituents of mental phenomena. The paper also suggests that a behavioral alternative, based upon contributions by Ryle and Skinner, among others, retains the qualities of extended functionalism while warding off its shortcomings.

Lazzeri, Filipe (2017) Extended Functionalism From A Behavioral Perspective. Behavior and Philosophy, 45, 1-21

Abstract:  B.F. Skinner argued that in a causal chain from an environmental cause, E, to an inner state, I, and then to a behavior, B, the prediction, explanation, and control of B can be achieved better by focusing on the environmental cause, E, than by focusing on the inner state, I. In particular, he claims that the observable relationship of E to B is not affected by whether the inner state, I, exists.  The present paper evaluates Skinner’s claims and then shifts from a causal chain to a different causal arrangement, wherein two environmental states, E1 and E2, each causally contribute to a behavior, B.  In this case, postulating an inner state, I, that is caused by both E1 and E2, and which causes I, affects one’s predictions concerning the relationship between environment and behavior.

Sober, Eliott (2017) Methodological Behaviorism, Causal Chains, and Causal Forks. Behavior and Philosophy, 45, 22-26

Abstract: B. F. Skinner’s radical behaviorism has been highly successful experimentally, revealing new phenomena with new methods. But Skinner’s dismissal of theory limited its development. Theoretical behaviorism recognizes that a historical system, an organism, has a state as well as sensitivity to stimuli and the ability to emit responses. Indeed, Skinner himself acknowledged the possibility of what he called “latent” responses in humans, even though he neglected to extend this idea to rats and pigeons. Latent responses constitute a repertoire, from which operant reinforcement can select. The paper describes some applications of theoretical behaviorism to operant learning.

Staddon, John (2017) Theoretical Behaviorism. Behavior and Philosophy, 45, 27-44

Abstract: Meehl (1978) argued that clinical psychology has made slow scientific progress and in the subsequent forty years this situation unfortunately has not changed. This paper argues that the reasons for this slow progress is that science in clinical psychology is not being conducted well. Part of the problem is that the standard view that science controls for human cognitive weaknesses such as confirmation bias is too narrow. We argue that increased scientific progress may be achieved by conducting better science along four dimensions: 1) use of severe tests in the Neo-Popperian sense; 2) testing hypotheses of higher empirical content; 3) an increased orientation toward, and clarity of, problem solving in research; and 4) executing these with increased epistemic virtue, particularly in the design and reporting of such tests. Good science may require good character and a proper appraisal of research may require increased attention to relevant epistemic virtues.

O’Donohue, William, Casas, Jena B., Szoke, Daniel R., Cheung, Dominique, Hmaidan, Reem I., Burleigh, Kenneth J. (2017) Scientific Progress in Clinical Psychology and Epistemically Virtuous Research. Behavior and Philosophy, 45, 45-63

Abstract: Realism, defined as belief in a real world separate from perception, is incompatible with a science of behavior. Alternatives to it include Eastern philosophy, which holds that the world is only perception, and pragmatism, which dismisses the belief as irrelevant. The reason realism is incompatible with a science of behavior is that separating perception of objects from real objects leads directly to subjective-objective or inner-outer dualism. This dualism, in turn, leads directly to mentalism, the practice of offering inner entities as explanations of behavior. Positing unobservable causes renders a science incoherent. Ontology for behavior requires two distinctions: (a) between classes and individuals; and (b) between objects and processes. These distinctions allow a workable ontology in which behavior consists of activities that are extended in time (i.e., processes) and are ontological individuals—functional wholes with parts that also are activities. Such an ontology provides coherence to a science of behavior.

Baum, William M. (2017) Ontology For Behavior Analysis: Not Realism, Classes, Or Objects, But Individuals And Processes. Behavior and Philosophy, 45, 64-78

Abstract: It is generally assumed that responsibility for one’s deeds should be assessed using a priori legal and moral standards. However, we know no such standards. Therefore, we must use our own man-made standards. Accordingly, the empirical meaning of being responsible is liability under the applicable rules to being held responsible. Responsibility is assigned, not discovered.

Hocutt, Max (2017) Just Responsibility. Behavior and Philosophy, 45, 79-89